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Abstract: Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is.  Often they have looked 
for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do.  Given the diversity of topics and 
methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach.  In this article we 
consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: What are philosophers 
like?  Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that 
philosophers are especially reflective: They are less likely than their peers to embrace what 
seems obvious without questioning it.  This claim is supported by a study of more than 4,000 
philosophers and non-philosophers, the results of which indicate that even when we control for 
overall education level, philosophers tend to be significantly more reflective than their peers.  
We then illustrate this tendency by considering what we know about the philosophizing of a few 
prominent philosophers.  Recognizing this aspect of the philosophical temperament, it is natural 
to wonder how philosophers came to be this way: Does philosophical training teach reflectivity 
or do more reflective people tend to gravitate to philosophy?  We consider the limitations of our 
data with respect to this question and suggest that a longitudinal study be conducted. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Many signs point to an identity crisis in contemporary philosophy.1  As a group, we philosophers 
are puzzled and conflicted about what exactly philosophy is.  Thus, in the preface of The 
Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson writes, “This book grew out of a sense that 
contemporary philosophy lacks a self-image that does it justice” (2007, p. ix).  The debate 
spurred by this identity crisis has by and large focused on methodology, and understandably so: 
If one wants to characterize the nature of philosophy, it seems natural to focus on what 
philosophers do and on what tools they employ.  Unfortunately, this approach has so far been 
fruitless as there has been little convergence between philosophers defending different 
                                                 
1. We are certainly not the first generation of philosophers to wonder about our identity (e.g., Popper, 1952). 
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methodologies.  In fact, this lack of convergence is plausibly not an accident since philosophers 
have always relied on a range of methods.  The identity crisis is thus as urgent as ever. 
 In the present paper, we attack this identity crisis from a different angle.  Rather than 
looking at what philosophers do, we examine who philosophers are, and rather than confronting 
philosophical methodology, we consider philosophical temperament.  We offer evidence that 
philosophers are alike in being more reflective than their peers: They are less likely than their 
peers to embrace what seems obvious without questioning it, and they are disposed to submit to 
scrutiny their intuitive inclination to judge that something is the case.  If this is an important facet 
of philosophical personality, as our data suggest, then one obviously wants to know where it 
comes from: Does it result from philosophical training as one might hope?  Or, rather, is it the 
case that philosophers are more reflective because more reflective individuals are more likely to 
become philosophers? 
 Here is how we will proceed.  In Section 2, we describe our study.  In Section 3, we 
consider what our findings might tell us about philosophical temperament.  In Section 4, we ask 
where philosophical temperament comes from, and we lament that our data do not answer this 
question, despite our best analytic efforts.  Hence, in Section 5 we set out a proposal for further 
research into the origins of our reflective disposition. 
 
2. Philosophical Training and Cognitive Reflectivity 
In this section, we present the results of an extensive online study looking at cognitive 
reflectivity and how it varies with education in general and philosophical training in particular.  
Across more than four thousand participants, we found that philosophical training is positively 
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correlated with cognitive reflectivity even when overall education is taken into account.  Our 
data suggest that thinking reflectively is part of philosophical temperament.   
 
2.1 Cognitive Reflectivity 
As we will use the phrase, cognitive reflectivity is a disposition to challenge one’s own intuitions 
whenever presented with a novel problem, rather than simply relying on whatever first comes to 
mind.  Being reflective in this sense is not necessarily equivalent to thinking hard or thinking 
deeply.  One might think deeply about some problems when prompted to do so and yet not have 
any tendency to challenge one’s intuitions in general.  Or one might think hard about what 
follows from an intuition without ever stopping to ask whether or not that intuition is sound.  To 
measure a person’s cognitive reflectivity, we used the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) developed by Shane Frederick (2005).  Frederick notes that researchers often distinguish 
between two types of cognitive processes—what Keith Stanovich and Richard West (2000) call 
System-1 and System-2 processes.  System-1 processes are executed quickly and spontaneously, 
typically with no conscious deliberation, and require little attention.  By contrast, System-2 
processes take more time, involve conscious deliberation, and require concentration.  Frederick 
developed the CRT as a measure of how likely a person is to employ System-2 processes, 
thinking over a problem rather than simply relying on the intuitive answer.2 
                                                 
2. Frederick gives the following examples of tasks that rely on System-1 versus System-2 processes (2005, 26): 
“Recognizing that the face of the person entering the classroom belongs to your math teacher involves System-1 
processes—it occurs instantly and effortlessly and is unaffected by intellect, alertness, motivation or the difficulty of 
the math problem being attempted at the time.  Conversely, finding √19163 to two decimal places without a 
calculator involves System-2 processes—mental operations requiring effort, motivation, concentration, and the 
execution of learned rules.”  Note that the CRT remains an interesting measure of people’s tendency to rely on their 
intuitions to solve various intellectual tasks even if one is skeptical of the distinction between System-1 and System-
2 processes (for discussion of this distinction, see Gigerenzer and Regier, 1996; Machery, 2009, Chapter 5). 
Particularly, cognitive process tracing research indicates that CRT is associated with more elaborative and thorough 
reasoning during decision making (Cokely & Kelley, 2009). 
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 The idea behind the CRT is to present participants with questions that have clear intuitive 
answers that are nonetheless incorrect.  To arrive at the correct answer requires participants to 
move beyond the answer that initially comes to mind and to consciously reflect on the problem 
instead.  The CRT consists of three questions of this sort (Frederick, 2005, p. 27): 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total.  The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball.  How much 
does the ball cost?  _______ cents 
 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets?  _______ minutes 
 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads.  Every day, the patch doubles in size.  If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake?  _______ days 
 
A participant’s CRT score is simply the number of questions he or she answers correctly.  Each 
CRT question has an intuitive but incorrect answer.3  However, when one stops to think about 
the problem, the intuitive answer is readily seen to be false.  As Frederick notes, “Anyone who 
reflects upon it for even a moment would recognize that the difference between $1.00 and 10 
cents is only 90 cents, not $1.00 as the problem stipulates.  In this case, catching that error is 
tantamount to solving the problem” (2005, p. 26-27). 
 How should one expect philosophers to perform on the CRT?  Anecdotal support can be 
given both for the prediction that philosophers will perform relatively poorly on the test and for 
                                                 
3. That these problems each have an intuitive answer is supported by our experience with the problems; even 
knowing the answers, the intuitive but incorrect answers jump out at us.  Frederick offers additional support for this 
claim (2005, 27-28): “The proposition that the three CRT problems generate an incorrect ‘intuitive’ answer is 
supported by several facts.  First, among all the possible wrong answers people could give, the posited intuitive 
answers (10, 100, 24) dominate.  Second, even among those responding correctly, the wrong answer was often 
considered first, as is apparent from introspection, verbal reports and scribbles in the margin (for example, 10 cents 
was often crossed out next to 5 cents, but never the other way around).  Third, when asked to judge problem 
difficulty (by estimating the proportion of other respondents who would correctly solve them), respondents who 
missed the problems thought they were easier than the respondents who solved them.  For example, those who 
answered 10 cents to the ‘bat and ball’ problem estimated that 92 percent of people would correctly solve it, whereas 
those who answered ‘5 cents’ estimated that ‘only’ 62 percent would….  Fourth, respondents do much better on 
analogous problems that invite more computation.  For example, respondents miss the ‘bat and ball’ problem far 
more often than they miss the ‘banana and bagel’ problem: ‘A banana and a bagel cost 37 cents.  The banana costs 
13 cents more than the bagel.  How much does the bagel cost?’” 
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the prediction that they will perform relatively well.  Recent discussions of philosophical 
methodology have been focused on the use of intuitions in philosophical theorizing.4  Accepting 
that many philosophers rely on their intuitions about specific cases in their philosophical 
theorizing, one might predict that since philosophers give high credence to their intuitions, they 
will tend to do poorly on the CRT.  Alternatively, we might note that it is part of the stereotype 
of philosophers that they tend to think problems over, reflecting on them and considering them 
from various and sundry angles.  Accepting the accuracy of this stereotype, one might predict 
that philosophers will do quite well on the CRT (Cokely & Feltz, 2009).  To determine how 
philosophical training is actually related to CRT score we considered data we collected in 
connection with numerous other studies we conducted over the last year. 
 
2.2 Cognitive Reflection Study 
We collected data on 4,472 participants, 823 of whom reported having at least some 
philosophical training.5  Data was collected online through the Philosophical Personality 
website.6  In addition to the CRT, each participant was given a 10-item personality inventory, a 
philosophical probe,7 and short biographical and demographic questionnaires.  Participants were 
72.2% female, with a mean age of 35.8 years, and ranging in age from 18 to 100 years old.8 
                                                 
4. We explain what we take intuitions to be in Section 3.  
5. These numbers exclude 1,041 participants who did not complete the survey, 1,326 participants who were 
underage and not eligible to participate, and 536 non-native English speakers owing to a suspected selection effect.  
Philosophical training was coded on a scale from 0 (no training) to 5 (PhD).  Intermediate values represent (1) some 
undergraduate classes, (2) undergraduate degree, (3) some graduate classes, and (4) Master’s degree. 
6. http://www.philosophicalpersonality.com 
7. CRT data was collected over the course of running a number of different studies.  As such, subjects were given a 
wide range of different philosophical probes; none of these probes were specifically related to the CRT or cognitive 
reflection. 
8. We have doubts about the participants who reported ages over 90 years. However, we note that when we exclude 
all those reporting ages greater than 90 (seven data points), the estimated models are nearly identical to those 
reported below using the complete dataset. 
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 We found that the mean CRT score for the 823 participants with some philosophical 
training (0.98) was more than double the mean CRT score for those participants with no training 
in philosophy (0.44).  Further, the mean CRT score for the 158 participants with some graduate 
training in philosophy (1.32) was triple the mean CRT score for those without training in 
philosophy.  These results are shown graphically in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean CRT scores for participants with varying degrees of training in 
philosophy. 
 
 
Of course, people with training in philosophy tend to be better educated than people with no 
training in philosophy, and it is likely that education is positively correlated with cognitive 
reflectivity.  As such, it might be that the above numbers simply reflect the effect of education in 
general and not training in philosophy in particular. 
 What we actually find, however, is that training in philosophy positively correlates with 
CRT score even when controlling for education level.  Thus, if we consider each level of 
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education9 separately, what we find is that with the exception of participants with a vocational or 
trade degree, the mean score for participants with some training in philosophy is higher than for 
those without training in philosophy.  For example, 1201 participants reported that they had had 
some college education, and 189 of these also reported that they had had taken some philosophy 
classes.  The mean CRT score for the 189 participants who had taken some philosophy courses 
(0.74) was nearly 70% greater than the 1012 who had not taken philosophy courses (0.43).  
Similar effects held for other levels of college education, as can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean CRT scores for participants with and without training in philosophy, 
broken down by level of education. 
 
 
To put a finer point on it, we regressed CRT score on gender, education, philosophical training, 
and age according to the model: 
 Score = β0 + β1·Gender + β2·Philo + β3·Edu + β4·Age + εS 
                                                 
9. Levels of general education were coded on a scale of 1 (some high school) to 7 (graduate or professional degree).  
Intermediate values represent (2) high school graduate or equivalent, (3) vocational or trade degree, (4) some 
college, (5) associate degree, and (6) bachelor’s degree. 
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Philosophical training and education are both positively associated with CRT score and males 
have a significantly higher mean CRT score than females (with a model p-value of zero up to 
machine error).  The intercept is not significantly different from zero.  Point estimates for the 
other four parameters are b1 = 0.477, b2 = 0.147, b3 = 0.102, and b4 = -0.003.  However, since the 
scales on the predictor variables are different (education has seven levels, philosophical training 
has five, gender has only two, and age is practically continuous), point estimates from ordinary 
regression may be misleading with respect to the relative importance of the predictors. 
 In order to clearly exhibit the relative importance of the predictors, we normalized the 
variables to obtain the following point estimates for the four non-zero parameters: b1 = 0.240, b2 
= 0.131, b3 = 0.210, and b4 = -0.042.  Philosophical training is better than half as good a 
predictor of CRT score as gender or overall education.10  To reiterate, philosophical training is 
predictive of CRT score even when one knows how much overall education an individual has.  
The more philosophical training one has, the higher one’s CRT score is likely to be.  In Section 
4, we will consider whether our data support a causal interpretation of the regression model, but 
first, we consider what the mere association between philosophical training and CRT score might 
tell us about philosophical temperament. 
 
3. Philosophical Temperament 
Philosophers obviously form a disparate bunch: They engage with an impressively diverse range 
of issues (e.g. the reality of universals, the limits of knowledge, the nature of the levels of 
selection, the nature of just wars, etc.); they rely on very different methods (e.g. appeal to 
                                                 
10. When we added psychological training (measured on the same scale as philosophical training) to our model, we 
found that it was negatively associated with CRT score, with a normalized estimated coefficient of b5 = -0.067.  
Also, it is worth noting that while the predictive value of gender might seem surprising, it was expected.  Frederick 
(2005) found that on average men score significantly higher than women on the CRT (see Frederick, 2005, 37-38 for 
discussion). 
9 
 
intuitions, formalization, generalization from historical cases, or even experimentation); and they 
hold a wide range of opinions about specific problems (e.g. focusing merely on knowledge, 
foundationalism, coherentism, foundherentism, contextualism, conventionalism, reliabilism, 
pragmatism, etc.).  In fact, the diversity of philosophers’ interests, methods, and opinions is so 
great that looking for the nature of philosophy—philosophizing about philosophy, as it were—
might strike some as a clear waste of time (even as others write books on the topic).  
 However, the data presented in Section 2 suggest that the variety of interests, views, and 
methods among philosophers hides some deep commonalities.  Indeed, in light of that study, we 
hypothesize that philosophers tend to share a “philosophical temperament”—a cluster of 
dispositions that distinguishes philosophy from other intellectual endeavors.  Our findings 
concerning philosophers’ cognitive reflectivity cast light on a single, but important aspect of 
philosophical temperament.  To describe this aspect properly, it will be useful if we first explain 
what we mean by “intuition”: An intuition is a spontaneous intellectual sensation:  p seems to be 
true without being consciously inferred.  In considering the first question of the CRT, for 
example, it intuitively seems that the answer must be 10 cents.  Similarly, in the Gettier case, it 
intuitively seems that the agent does not have any knowledge, while in the bystander version of 
the Trolley case it intuitively seems morally permissible to push the lever.  An intuitive seeming 
is analogous to a perceptual seeming: In both cases, something seems to be the case that is not 
consciously inferred from something else; in both cases too, people need not endorse what seems 
to be the case—i.e., people may refrain from judging that what seems to be the case really is the 
case.11   
                                                 
11. Naturally, perceptual and intellectual seemings differ in that perception is involved in the former case, but not in 
the latter. 
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 Now, some people tend to put more faith in their intellectual and perceptual seemings 
than others.  That is, some people are disposed to believe that what seems to be the case really is 
the case, while others tend to “poke at their intuitions.” By “poking at intuitions,” we mean to 
cover a range of possible practices, which all have in common that they are meant to determine 
whether the intuition is trustworthy and should thus be endorsed.12  To our knowledge, nobody 
has attempted to describe these practices systematically.  Based on our own practices and what 
we can glean from philosophers’ (usually succinct) descriptions of their own philosophizing, 
these practices divide into at least three types.   
 First, some practices are meant to examine whether intuitions derive from processes 
known to be unreliable.  This can be done in various ways.  Philosophers may have acquired by 
experience the conviction that particular kinds of intuition are untrustworthy, and they might 
examine whether any particular intuition is of these kinds.  Philosophers may also examine 
whether their intuitions are elicited by irrelevant aspects of the eliciting thought experiments.  
Finally, philosophers may appeal to psychological findings about the biases that affect judgments 
to cast doubts on some of their intuitions (as proposed, e.g., by Doris & Stich, 2006; Nichols & 
Knobe, 2007; Appiah, 2008; but see Machery, forthcoming, for discussion). 
 Second, philosophers often avoid endorsing an intuition before having considered a range 
of variants on the thought experiment eliciting the intuition.  This way of poking at intuitions is 
well-described by Douglas Hofstadter in his critical discussion of Searle’s Chinese room thought 
experiment (Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981, p. 375): 
 In particular, we would like to show how Searle's setup is just one of a large family of 
 related thought experiments, several of which are the topics of other selections of this 
 book.  Each member of this family of thought experiments is defined by a particular 
 choice of “knob settings” on a thought-experiment generator.  Its purpose is to create—in 
 your mind’s eye—various sorts of imaginary simulations of human mental activity. Each 
                                                 
12. Which is not to say that such practices are reliable to meet this goal. 
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 different thought experiment is an “intuition pump” (Dennett's term) that magnifies one 
 facet or other of the issue, tending to push the reader toward certain conclusions. 
 
More recently, Daniel Dennett (2005, p. 104) has noted that he embraces the method detailed by 
Hofstadter:  
 But is it a good intuition pump?  How could we tell?  Douglas Hofstadter's classic advice 
 to philosophers confronted by a thought experiment is to treat it the way scientists treat a 
 phenomenon of interest: vary it, turn it over, examine it from all angles, and in different 
 settings and conditions, just to make sure you aren't taken in by illusions of causation.  
 Turn all the knobs, he said, and see if the thing still pumps the same intuitions. 
 
As with perception, Dennett suggests that we check the correctness of our intuitions by turning 
the object of intuition on all sides in order to get a good view of it. 
 Third, philosophers typically check whether intuitions and their implications are 
consistent with their beliefs, assuming that inconsistency would be a prima facie reason to 
question an intuition’s trustworthiness.  And we suspect that there might well be other intuition-
poking practices employed by philosophers.  
 Two additional points are worth noting about intuition-poking.  That philosophers 
employ such intuition-poking practices does not necessarily entail that they do so explicitly; 
rather, these practices may be skills that are implicit in expert philosophizing.  In this regard, the 
situation may be similar to scientists’ attitudes toward experimentation.  Allan Franklin (2002, 
2009) has convincingly argued that scientists embrace a class of strategies to determine the 
trustworthiness of experimental results in spite of having rarely identified these strategies 
explicitly.13   
 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the practices philosophers rely on to poke at intuitions 
really allow them to effectively sort trustworthy from untrustworthy intuitions: It could be that 
                                                 
13. But see, e.g., Cook and Campbell (1979) for a well-known attempt at systematizing these strategies in the 
behavioral sciences. 
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philosophers’ usual practices are inefficient.  Absent a systematic characterization of these 
practices, it is hard to say (for skepticism on this point, see Weinberg, 2007).  
 We propose that philosophers have a greater tendency to poke at their intuitions than do 
equally educated non-philosophers.  That is, we propose that, by training or by selection (see 
Section 4), philosophers are less likely to blindly accept their intuitions and more likely to submit 
those intuitions to scrutiny.  Philosophers ponder; they question their gut reactions, readily taking 
a skeptical eye toward how things seem to them.  Philosophers’ epistemic relation to their 
intellectual seemings can be usefully compared to the relation of airplane pilots to perceptual 
seemings during visually guided flights (e.g., the flights of non-commercial planes in the VFR 
[“visual flight rules”] corridors around Manhattan).  Because vision through the cockpit may be 
distorted, it is part of pilots’ expertise to be less likely to blindly follow their perceptual 
seemings. 
 The hypothesis that philosophers are more likely than non-philosophers to scrutinize their 
intuitions naturally explains our findings about philosophers’ CRT scores: Because philosophers 
tend to poke at intuitions, they are more likely to identify those intuitions that are defective than 
equally educated people.  This explains why they tend to do better than others on the CRT even 
when we control for education.  
 Importantly, to say that philosophers are particularly disposed to poke at intuitions is not 
to deny that philosophers often view the intuitiveness of a proposition as evidence for its truth.  
In fact, although some philosophers have challenged the claim that intuitiveness carries any 
epistemic weight (e.g., Hintikka, 1999; Williamson, 2007), a philosopher as influential as Saul 
Kripke writes (1972/1980, p. 42): 
 Of course, some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very 
 inconclusive evidence in favor of it.  I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of 
13 
 
 anything, myself.  I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can 
 have about anything, ultimately speaking. 
 
There is no inconsistency between being disposed to poke at one’s intuitions and taking 
intuitiveness as evidence for the truth of propositions, for when the intuition survives an expert 
philosopher’s critical scrutiny, the fact that a proposition was intuited might be taken to carry 
some particular weight with respect to the truth of this proposition. 
 However one feels about the evidential weight of intuitions, our claim is that 
philosophers have a distinctive tendency to question intuitions.  Philosophers are typically more 
critical and more skeptical of what seem to be intuitively the case than non-philosophers.  Our 
proposal about the philosophical temperament is well illustrated by what we know of the 
philosophizing of some prominent philosophers.  David Lewis is a case in point (see also the 
quotation from Dennett above).14  Lewis characterizes his approach to philosophy succinctly at 
the beginning of Philosophical Papers I.  He writes (1983, p. x): 
 Our “intuitions” are simply opinions; our philosophical theories are the same.  Some are 
 commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular, some general; some are 
 more firmly held, some less.  But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a 
 philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium.  Our common task is to find out what 
 equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come 
 to rest at one or another of them. 
 
On Lewis’s view, philosophizing consists in probing one’s and other’s opinions—including 
one’s philosophical beliefs and intuitions—through argument in order to test their coherence.  
One thereby determines the costs of holding various opinions, including the costs of endorsing 
one’s intuitions.  Continuing, Lewis tells us that philosophy is about measuring the price of 
maintaining specified collections of opinions (1983, p. x):  
 Philosophical theories are never refuted conclusively.  (Or hardly ever. Gödel and Gettier 
 may have done it.)  The theory survives its refutation—at a price.  Argle (a character in 
                                                 
14. Our description of Lewis’ philosophizing is only based on our acquaintance with his philosophical writings. 
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 [Lewis’s] paper, Holes) has said what we accomplish in philosophical argument: we 
 measure the price. 
 
Surely, some will disagree with Lewis’s view about the nature of philosophizing, and we do not 
mean to endorse or even recommend it here.  Our point is merely that Lewis treats intuitions as 
opinions: They are things philosophers need to inspect on a par with philosophical claims and 
inspecting them consists in evaluating their costs—determining what views and what other 
intuitions would have to be rejected if one were to endorse them.  Just like philosophical views 
and arguments, intuitions are thoroughly examined before being endorsed.  
 Anecdotes are also supportive of our characterization of the philosophical temperament.  
To give but one of many examples, in 2007, the Philosophy Talk radio program aired an episode 
titled, “If Truth is so valuable, why is there so much BS?”15  After a listener’s interesting 
question near the end of the program, Ken Taylor (one of the hosts) asks Harry Frankfurt (the 
guest), “Harry, what do you think?”  Frankfurt replies, “What do I think?  … Do I have time to 
think?” (emphasis in the original).   
 
4. Education versus Selection 
Where does the philosophical disposition to poke at intuitions come from?  Is philosophical 
temperament something that can be instilled through training (as “educationists” would say) or 
are people with a skeptical temperament more likely to become philosophers, perhaps because 
they are pushed by philosophy professors to become philosophers (as “selectionists” would say)?  
Perhaps philosophical temperament is due in part to both learning and selection.  The problem 
here is one of causal inference.  Having seen that philosophical training is associated with CRT 
score, we want to know what the causal relationship is between philosophical training and 
                                                 
15. http://www.philosophytalk.org/pastShows/BS.html 
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cognitive reflectivity.  In this section we apply graphical search and structural equation modeling 
to our data but are forced to conclude that they do not answer the causal question. 
 We would like to know whether philosophical training causes ordinary people to become 
more reflective or rather selects for more reflective people.  Since CRT score is our only measure 
(or indicator) of reflectivity, in the context of the causal models below, we treat CRT as a proxy 
for reflectivity.16  The selectionist/educationist debate comes down to deciding whether Philo 
causes Reflect or whether Reflect causes Philo.17  We investigated whether our data could 
provide evidence on the direction of this causal relationship by using Tetrad IV18 to search for all 
the causal models (including models with unmeasured common causes) that are consistent with 
the sample covariances (Table 1) over Score, Philo, Edu, Age, and Gender.   
 
 Score Philo Edu Age Gender 
Score 0.802 0.172 0.417 -0.159 0.107 
Philo 0.172 0.636 0.511 -0.154 0.056 
Edu 0.417 0.511 3.422 5.591 0.017 
Age -0.159 -0.154 5.591 211.982 -0.317 
Gender 0.107 0.056 0.017 -0.317 0.201 
 
Table 1: Covariance matrix for the variables Score, Philo, Edu, Age, and Gender. 
                                                 
16. Since we are treating CRT score as equivalent to Reflectivity itself, all our models are observational.  Identifying 
CRT score with the latent (unmeasured) variable Reflectivity is a strong assumption forced on us by the fact that we 
have only one measure of Reflectivity.  Our data do not guarantee that CRT score is a good measure of Reflectivity, 
though such a guarantee is possible in principle.  Note that we are not so daft as to claim that manipulating a 
participant’s CRT score might affect that participant’s level of philosophical training.  Whenever a model asserts 
that CRT score causes philosophical training, it should be understood as asserting that cognitive reflectivity—a 
relatively persistent trait of an individual—causes philosophical training.  Such models assert that if one could 
intervene to make an individual more reflective, then we would expect that individual to acquire more philosophical 
training with some unknown time lag. 
18. If, as we suspect, philosophical training and reflectivity are connected by a feedback mechanism, the debate 
must change in character.  However, as we shall see, many interesting issues remain if philosophical training and 
reflectivity are assumed to be mutual causes. 
17. Tetrad is available at www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/tetrad  
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The FCI algorithm in Tetrad IV outputs the PAG (partial ancestral graph) shown in Figure 3.  
According to this PAG, in no causal model consistent with the data is Score a cause of any other 
variable except perhaps Philo.   
 
Figure 3: PAG output of an FCI search in Tetrad over the variables Score, Philo, Edu, 
Age, and Gender. 
 
 
The unoriented edge between Gender and Age is an expected artifact—a selection effect due to 
the fact that women have longer life expectancy than men.    The PAG entails many other causal 
constraints on the set of models that fit out data, but it does not orient the edge connecting Philo 
and Score, which means that there is not enough information in the data to determine the causal 
direction between them, and thus not enough information to choose between a selectionist or 
educationist model.   
Although a PAG represents an equivalence class of causal models that all fit or don't fit 
the data equally well, it does not guarantee that any member of the class actually fits the data.  
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To answer this question, we chose two representatives of the equivalence class and two close 
variants that agreed on all causal relations except the one between Philo and Score.  In all four 
models, Gender causes Age, Philo, and Score; Age causes Edu; and Philo causes Edu.  The four 
possible relationships we estimated between Philo and Score are: (1) Philo causes Score, (2) 
Score causes Philo, (3) Philo and Score are effects of an unmeasured common cause (treated as 
an unexplained covariance), and (4) Philo and Score are mutual causes.  Label the models (1) 
Educationist, (2) Selectionist, (3) Covariance, and (4) Feedback (see Figure 4).  Models 1 and 3 
are members of the equivalence class. 
 
Figure 4: Four distinct causal models: (1) Educationist, (2) Selectionist, (3) Covariance, 
(4) Feedback. 
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Each graph can be statistically interpreted as a structural equation model, and its parameters and 
statistical fit estimated in Tetrad or with the sem package in R.  Standardized estimates are given 
in Figure 5.  In these models, the edge coefficients represent the expected change in an effect 
upon intervening to change the cause by one unit while holding fixed all other variables in the 
model.   Since all variables are standardized to have unit variance and mean zero, estimates on 
multiple causes of a single variable represent the relative strengths of these causes. 
 
 
Figure 5: Standardized estimates of the relative strengths of the causal connections in 
each of the models shown in Figure 4. 
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None of these models may be rejected on the basis of our data, as can be seen from their values 
for selected indices of fit in Table 2. 
 
 (1) Educationist (2) Selectionist (3) Covariance (4) Feedback 
Model Chi-Square 3.2845 1.8714 3.2845 2.1092 
    Degrees of Freedom 3 3 3 2 
    P-Value 0.3498 0.5995 0.34981 0.3483 
Goodness of Fit 0.9997 0.9998 0.9997 0.9998 
Adjusted GFI 0.9985 0.9992 0.9985 0.9986 
Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.9980 0.9989 0.9980 0.9987 
Bentler CFI 0.9998 1.0000 0.9998 0.9999 
SRMR 0.0067 0.0052 0.0067 0.0061 
 
 
Table 2: Selected indices of fit for the four models shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
In fact, all four models fit the data extremely well.19  The fact that the data fit all of these models 
is bad news.  Our data do not answer the interesting causal question: was it training or selection 
that made philosophers more reflective than their peers?   
 The careful reader may have noticed something strange about the parameter estimates for 
Model 4 in Figure 5.  Specifically, R reports that the effect of reflectivity on philosophical 
training is positive but the effect of philosophical training on reflectivity is negative.  We want to 
be very cautious about endorsing any specific set of parameter estimates of Model 4, because we 
                                                 
19. The null hypothesis that the chi-square is testing here is that the covariance matrix generated by the model is 
identical to the observed covariance matrix.  Hence, unlike in ordinary hypothesis testing, we do not want to reject 
the null.  Except for SRMR, the other measures indicate a good fit when they are close to one.  SRMR indicates a 
good fit when it is close to zero. 
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suspect it is locally under-identified.  That is, we suspect that the data do not determine a unique 
estimate for the coefficients in the feedback loop, though they may uniquely determine some of 
the other parameters in the model.  Hence, we checked our results by estimating the parameters 
using a Bayesian technique (MCMC with non-informative priors) in AMOS 17.0.  We found 
nearly identical estimates for Models 1-3 but not for Model 4.  In Model 4, AMOS reversed the 
signs for the edges from Gender to Philo and from Philo to Edu.  Moreover, AMOS gave 
different estimates for the coefficients in the feedback loop, though they had the same signs as 
the ones computed in R. 
Were Model 4 (with the estimates computed in R or in AMOS) correct, it would indicate 
that while philosophy preferentially attracts and retains reflective people, philosophical training 
as such makes people less reflective than they would have been without their training.  Anything 
said about this possibility is doubly speculative, since on the one hand, all four of the causal 
models we have considered fit the data, and on the other hand, Model 4 is itself under-identified.  
However, keeping those caveats in mind, we will venture a speculative story.  Perhaps doing 
good philosophy requires a certain reluctance to endorse one’s intuitions.  Nevertheless, as one 
does more and more philosophy, one comes to trust one’s intuitions more and more.  At every 
stage of education, only the best philosophers are selected to go on, but those philosophers will 
incur a cost for their devotion—they become less reflective.  This story is meant to be 
provocative, not assertive, since the data are not clear on this point. 
 Our data are surprisingly rich and they place significant constraints on possible causal 
models, including that gender and education are not directly connected and that age and 
philosophical training are not directly connected.  Also they tell us something interesting 
conditional on which model is true; they tell us something very interesting conditional on the 
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Feedback model being true.  Nonetheless, they do not provide an unconditional answer to the 
question, “Are philosophers more reflective than their peers because of learning or selection?”  
Both the educationist model and the selectionist model fit the data very well, and two other 
models that are not clearly educationist or selectionist also fit the data. 
 Overall, we find that our data do not tell us how philosophers came to be more reflective 
than their peers.  And we cannot do any better than this without either adding theoretical 
constraints (which we have no defensible reason for doing) or collecting data in a way that 
entails further constraints (by collecting data generated from an experiment or a quasi-
experiment).  One simple way to do the latter is to conduct a longitudinal study and we consider 
how this might be done in the next section. 
 
5. A Proposed Longitudinal Study 
Our data do not speak clearly to the question of how we came to be more reflective than those 
around us.  What are we to do?  The question would certainly be answered by a controlled 
experiment in which we intervened to increase some participants’ level of philosophical training.  
But such an experiment is not feasible.  Instead, we will recommend a longitudinal study.  
 Longitudinal studies are well-suited to deciding between causal models like the ones 
considered in Section 4 because data is gathered from participants at more than one point in time, 
allowing the researcher to see how the participants have changed over the observation period.  If 
we were to test the cognitive reflectivity of a group of students entering college and again upon 
graduation, and we found that students who took philosophy courses showed a greater increase 
in cognitive reflectivity over that period of time than those students who did not, then we would 
have reason to believe that philosophical training teaches cognitive reflectivity.  Alternatively, if 
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we found that students who end up receiving graduate degrees in philosophy tend to be more 
cognitively reflective at the start of their undergraduate training, then we would have reason to 
believe that philosophical training selects for cognitive reflectivity. 
 We think that some simple short- and long-term observations could help better determine 
the relation between philosophical training and cognitive reflectivity. Take four groups of 
college freshmen in the two-by-two Solomon design (1949) described in Table 3.  
 
 Philosophical Training No Philosophical Training 
Pre-Test Group I Group III 
No Pre-Test Group II Group IV 
 
Table 3: Two-by-two Solomon design for a longitudinal study on philosophical training 
and reflectivity. 
 
 
In the short-term, all four groups would receive the CRT at the end of one semester (the CRT 
post-test), but only Groups I and III would also receive a CRT pre-test.20  The Solomon design 
controls for the confounding possibility that the act of measuring CRT score in a pre-test changes 
participants’ scores on subsequent measurements (Hultsch & Deutsch, 1981; Rosenthal & 
Rosnow, 1984).  The Solomon design allows us to (1) estimate the effect pre-testing would have 
had on Groups II and IV by looking at data from Groups I and II, (2) ensure that Group II's and 
Group IV's post-tests are not influenced by learning from being given the pre-test, and (3) 
determine if pre-testing had an effect on subsequent judgments by comparing the post-test scores 
of Groups I and III with those of Groups II and IV (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984, 93-94).  If, after 
correcting for such effects, Group I were to show greater improvement on the CRT than Group 
                                                 
20. Both the post-test and the pre-test might just consist in the three-item CRT; alternatively, additional items could 
be developed or the CRT problems divided between multiple tests. 
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III, then we would have reason to believe that the educationists are right and philosophical 
training causes reflectivity. 
 In the long-term, the philosophical training of participants should be tracked to see 
whether those with high initial CRT scores are more likely to take philosophy classes or obtain a 
philosophy degree than participants with low initial CRT scores.  If participants with high initial 
CRT scores were more likely to obtain philosophical training than those with low initial CRT 
scores, then we would have reason to believe that the selectionists are right and philosophical 
training selects for higher cognitive reflectivity.  Were we to see positive results in both the 
short- and long-term observations, then we would have evidence of feedback between 
philosophical training and cognitive reflection.21 
 
6. Conclusion 
Philosophers have worried about just what philosophy is, often looking for an answer by 
considering what philosophers do.  We have taken a different approach in this article, asking 
what philosophers are like.  Based on an extensive internet study of both philosophers and non-
philosophers, we have argued that in comparison to their peers, philosophers are especially 
reflective.  We then suggested that this is an important commonality amongst philosophers, 
forming one aspect of the philosophical temperament.  Accepting that reflectivity is an important 
aspect of the philosophical temperament, a follow-up question naturally arises: How did we get 
to be this way?  We considered what our data can tell us about this question, looking at a range 
                                                 
21. It is worth noting that cohort effects can be a problem for longitudinal studies and that our proposed study is no 
exception.  In a simple longitudinal study, only one cohort is studied over time (e.g., students as they enter into 
college) and that group of individuals may have unique, shared experiences that make them non-representative of 
other cohorts.  One way to control for this is to use a “sequential” experimental design (Hultsch and Deutsch, 1981; 
Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1984).  In sequential designs, one conducts several longitudinal experiments using different 
cohorts.  Because the participants belong to different cohorts, it is possible to determine differences that are likely 
due to differences in shared experiences unrelated to the question of interest.  Moreover, because different cohorts 
are used, it is more likely that effects found in both studies are generalizable to other cohorts. 
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of causal models, but unfortunately were forced to conclude that our data are unable to offer a 
compelling answer to the question.  The task is not hopeless, however, and we suggested how the 
question can be answered by conducting a longitudinal study.  
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